By Jamal Nusseibeh
As we continue daily to witness the unimaginable devastation of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip by a prolonged military campaign of extermination, taking place under the jaded gaze of the entire world, how can we look elsewhere? For many commentators, analysts, activists, a ceasefire agreement in Gaza is the only topic. And yet, Gaza, or even the Gaza Strip, is not a separate entity, but a part of the internationally recognized Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT); and as such, a part of the State of Palestine that is internationally recognized by 75 percent of the world’s countries. So, to start discussing the West Bank, one must first address the umbilical connection between the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. Apart from the hiatus between 1948 and 1967, and until the Oslo era, movement into and between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (and indeed 1948 Israel) was basically free and unimpeded. Families existed and exist – marriages, cousins, grandparents – across these arbitrary lines; the economy was united, as were the laws and structures of the nascent authority in the years after 1995; and the goal of achieving freedom was the same.
Palestinians descend from among the first peoples to cultivate and settle land on our planet. Social structures are local and deep, but also interlinked throughout the country; across the centuries, families intermarried from the north to the south, the east to the west. The impact of the pogroms and massacres of 1947 and 1948, the Nakba, was cataclysmic – people scattered, and the country was divided arbitrarily along an armistice line into three parts: the new State of Israel, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), and the Gaza Strip. Palestine was eviscerated.
Palestinians who were not forced out of Israel lived under a military regime for twenty years before acquiring basic rights; and in many cases, their original villages and lands were wiped out or confiscated, and they became refugees within their own country. In the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians displaced from the new Israel flooded in, creating new social structures next to the ancient ones, still holding onto their original family ties, but bereft of their belongings and their belonging. These refugees (as well those expelled to Lebanon and Jordan and beyond) add another layer of complexity to the interlinkage of the Palestinian population, as communities and geographies dispersed across territories and countries.
Today, as the world focuses on the latest daily massacre of “Gazans,” it loses sight of the fact that these Palestinians are not a separate entity – many are not “Gazans” by Palestinian standards; most of them are refugees from elsewhere in the country. They are Palestinians, linked to other Palestinians by blood and ancient family ties at different levels. The world has also lost sight of the fact that the continued violence perpetrated by Israel in the occupied West Bank (including East Jerusalem) does not target “West Bankers” but Palestinians as a whole – in the West Bank, the Palestinian population includes almost 900,000 refugees, whose plight remains dire.
It is also important to specify what the “West Bank” is and isn’t. Despite the consistency of international law on this matter, most international commentators and even politicians now refer to the West Bank as distinct from Jerusalem, following Israeli policy. (And in this case, there is also a question about which Jerusalem borders are being referenced – the municipal ones on the eve of the occupation, the ones unilaterally expanded by Israel in 1967 (all the way to Bethlehem and halfway to Jericho), or the actual physical contours of the (illegal) Separation Wall? Under international law, as reiterated once again by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its recent Advisory Opinion, the West Bank includes East Jerusalem – the Armistice Line of 1948 is the accepted frontier. Prior to 1967, Jerusalem was the center of the West Bank (and prior to 1948 it was the heart of Palestine) economically, socially, and spiritually; and it remained so during the years following the 1967 occupation, during which East (and West) Jerusalem was basically freely accessible to all inhabitants of Israel and the OPT.*
With the Oslo Accords of 1993, this changed. Access to Jerusalem became increasingly restricted to its (forcibly diminishing) residents, initially through checkpoints that slowly became permanent, then by a looming Separation Wall cutting deep into the West Bank territory, including a larger East Jerusalem within Israeli control, but also slicing through West Bank towns and villages, cutting farmers off from their land and villagers from their schools, and tearing families apart. Within this smaller West Bank, yet further fragmented by internal Israeli checkpoints and road closures, Israeli settler-only highways were built and settlements grew on confiscated lands, rising to house almost 700,000 settlers today. Meanwhile, the remaining West Bank was subdivided into Areas A, B, and C, in which the new Palestinian Authority’s (already curtailed) jurisdiction was limited to the urban centers included in Area A, with weak powers in Area B, and no jurisdiction over Area C – the majority of West Bank land. This new legal and physical maze created a massive shift in the socioeconomic geography of the West Bank. With Jerusalem cut off, and Israel controlling land, water, and other resources (such as oil deposits), markets and institutions re-centered on Ramallah, Nablus, and Hebron; tall apartment blocks competed for the skies in these cities, while Jerusalem withered without its vine; and an influx of workers moved into West Bank cities from their rural homes, searching for opportunity and stability, and safety away from the settler hordes.
Now, while the level of savagery and scale of mass murder that Israel has meted out in Gaza is almost impossible to comprehend, the same exclusivist ideology is driving violent and aggressive action by Israel in the West Bank to ethnically cleanse the land from its (remaining) inhabitants. As hilltop settlers have essentially become the Israeli government, new pogroms are being carried out under the supervision of the Israeli army, and with legal backing from the Military Administration; and deadly, destructive Israeli military raids are regular occurrences. These appalling facts are all well documented. The ICJ opinion in July made specific reference to the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the illegality of Israel’s practices there in discussing the illegality of the occupation and its consequences.
In the West Bank, 2023 and 2024 have been the worst years in over two decades. In 2023, 509 Palestinians were killed by Israeli army soldiers and settlers, with three attacks by settlers (with or without the army) reported every day against Palestinians. In 2024, that number is already over 650 and rising. In addition to continuing settler attacks on villages such as Lubban al-Sharqiyya in June 2023 (pre-dating the October 7 escalation), farmers are terrorized, with almost 2,000 people displaced in 2024, and almost 1,000 structures demolished; and land is being confiscated for Israeli settlement in ever-larger blocs and with ever-increasing frequency. Meanwhile, Israeli army raids into West Bank towns and refugee camps are beginning to follow similar patterns to their attacks on Gaza: enormous violence, massive destruction of infrastructure, use of drones, and absolute terror for the local civilians.
It is important to understand that Israel’s recent policies and actions are not an aberration, but a plan which has been under implementation, at one speed or another, for decades. The latest phase in its implementation was the – flagrantly illegal – move last February to transfer control of the West Bank from the military administration to civilian control under settler Minister Bezalel Smotrich (see the article by Jad Isaac and Suhail Khalilieh in this issue, which examines the Smotrich plan).
This (lengthy) preamble provides three principal axes for discussing the West Bank today: first, the misery, danger, and violence suffered by Palestinians, which is growing by the day and is untenable; second, Israel’s continued and accelerated political and legal action to gain control of more land and import more of its citizens into the occupied territory while forcing the native Palestinians out; and third, the complexity of Palestinian political and social infrastructure – throughout Palestine and in exile – fragmented by war and years of occupation, and deliberately undermined by decades of concerted action by Israel (helped along the way by the corruption and incompetence of the Palestinian Authority).
With that understanding in mind, any forward-looking proposal (for any part of Palestine, including the West Bank) needs, first and foremost, to be built upon the unity of the Palestinian people. Second, it needs to remedy urgent needs prior to resolving the deeper issues. Third, it must provide a context for the unified expression of the Palestinian will, with all its diversity and differences.
Building upon the unity of the Palestinian people means that the West Bank must not be separated from Gaza, and that its fate cannot be separate. It also means that the West Bank cannot continue as mini cantons, separated into different legal jurisdictions (by the failed Oslo Accords), but must be treated as a unified and single legal entity both within itself (no more Areas A, B, and C) and also with the Gaza Strip (whether as the OPT or as the State of Palestine). That legal entity must include East Jerusalem, which is not only an integral part, but indeed the heart of that entity. Israel cannot be allowed to continue to separate town from town (including Jerusalem), village from village, farmers from land, and children from schools on a daily basis.
From another angle, the unity of the Palestinian people means that the
Palestinians in the West Bank should not be treated differently, or have a different legal
status than the Palestinians in East Jerusalem or the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, all of whom are Palestinians residing in the OPT/Palestine. It also means that all Palestinians, wherever they reside and whatever citizenship they may hold, if they hold one – be it Israeli, Jordanian, or American, for instance – are considered part of the Palestinian polity and must have a say in the future of Palestine and the Palestinians.
To the second point outlined above, any forward-looking proposal must first address urgent needs prior to resolving the deeper issues. First and foremost, this means that Palestinians in Palestine (Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem) must be provided with safety and stability. Referring specifically to the West Bank, Israeli pogroms and raids must be stopped. Israeli land confiscations must be stopped. Israeli checkpoints need to be dismantled. Palestinians must be allowed to lead normal lives, free from fear and violence. They must be allowed to move freely in their territory, from Tubas through Jerusalem to Hebron (and, once arrangements have been worked out, to Gaza too). As noted above, this was the situation for decades prior to the Oslo Accords, and Israel did not suffer from it during that time. Violent resistance grows when other options have failed, and when life is intolerable.
To ensure both that Israel can acquiesce and do the right thing with sufficient comfort and security, and that Palestinians are kept safe from the Israeli army and settlers, a temporary international peace-keeping force would be necessary. This idea is already gaining momentum for a “day-after” scenario in Gaza, but for the reasons set out above, including the urgently deteriorating situation in the West Bank, and the intricate interconnection of Palestinians throughout the country, it cannot work unless inclusive of the rest of the OPT/Palestine as well. Replacing the occupying Israeli army with international peacekeepers (entering at the invitation of the State of Palestine on a transitional basis) would finally end the occupation. It would allow both Palestinians and Israelis to feel safe and secure. It would provide time and space to resolve the deeper issues – building a safe and secure Palestinian state next to a safe and secure Israeli state, or ensuring equal rights for all people in a single polity between the river and the sea – more calmly and peaceably. (It would also provide the beginning of a framework for aid and reconstruction in Gaza, and a platform on which to begin some form of reconciliation, possibly through transitional justice mechanisms.)
Which brings us to the third point: the context for the unified expression of the Palestinian will. Palestinians have never had a chance to express their will through free and fair elections – the elections under the Oslo Accords of 1993 (in 1996 and 2006) were limited in jurisdiction and allowed only a small segment of the Palestinian people to vote for a limited authority. Palestinians have a basic right to express their will. This can be exercised in one of only two formats: either in a Palestinian state, or individually in the context of a “one-state” structure with the Israelis. Since a State of Palestine already exists, it is logical that there should first be elections within that context for a new government or constitutional council, in which all Palestinians, including those in the diaspora, can vote. The newly constituted council can then take decisions on how to move forward with Israel, whether as a completely separate country, or in some form of confederation, or even merged (if the people wills it) into one polity with equal political and civil rights.
For this third aspect of the forward-looking proposal to be successful, however, the first and second must be addressed first: that is, the violence has to end, Palestinians must feel safe and secure, and they must know that they are voting in the context of a free Palestine for the future of their country and their people. Only the presence of international peacekeepers, and the absence of Israeli control, will allow these elections to take place freely and fairly. Only thus would the focus of this election be building the future. Any elections that take place within the context of occupation will have only one focus – namely, how to resist and end the occupation.
To sum up, Israel’s occupation of the OPT/Palestine must end, and Palestinians need urgent international protection in their own state. We will not be able to achieve the end of occupation without help; and we need protection for our citizens in the West Bank and in Gaza. These elements are not negotiable and should not be left to the occupying power to decide – they are moral and legal imperatives, and should be enforced by all members of the United Nations as part of their obligations under the UN Charter, and indeed as part of their common responsibility to humanity. The West Bank – including Jerusalem – is and will be in equal need of protection, and is and must be part of the resolution of the conflict, which has been allowed to go on for far, far too long.
*More on Jerusalem in part 2 of this article next month.
